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ABSTRACT 
The “resource curse” is a familiar and recurring theme in development economics. But does 
resource abundance also lead to resource inefficiency? And if so, what can contribute to better 
usage of a country’s resources for development? This paper examines 130 countries from 1970-
2011, both resource-abundant and resource-scarce, and concludes that on average, resource-
abundant countries utilize resources less efficiently. Examining the institutional factors that may 
explain this disparity in usage, we find that several key institutions are necessary for increasing 
resource-use efficiency, with private property showing the largest economic and statistical 
significance. By improving basic institutions, resource-rich countries can thus see more 
environmentally-sustainable growth. 
JEL CODES: Q33, E02, Q56 
Keywords: Resource abundance, institutions, materials intensity 
 
Introduction 
Research has demonstrated that resource-abundant countries tend to have lower growth rates, on 
average, than countries that are resource-scarce (Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001 and Arezki and 
van der Ploeg 2007, among many others). A large literature on this phenomenon has sketched the 
channels in which resource abundance would cause economic stagnation, including: reducing 
human capital (Gylfason 2001); retarding development of economic institutions (Mehlum et. al 
2006); altering the development of political institutions and in particular fostering rent-seeking 
(Alkhater 2012); fostering conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2005); skewing incentives for prudent 
policies via an increased sense of security (Gylfason 2001); and increasing economic fragility 
(Rodrik 1999). 
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But while resource abundance may lead to economic stagnation via these several different 
intermediate effects, a less-explored theme in the literature is the direct effect of the abundance 
of resources on resource usage. As shown in Figure 1, the linkages between natural resource 
abundance and growth are second-order, in that they affect human capital, institutional 
development, and other components of the economy. Moreover, prior scholarship has already 
established linkages between growth and resource abundance and between resource efficiency 
(Coursey and Hartwell 2000) and growth. However, there should be a direct linkage between the 
abundance of resources and their usage; the question then becomes, how does resource 
abundance affect resource efficiency? And are there institutions that can contribute to better 
usage of a country’s resources for development?  
Figure 1 – Resources, Abundance, and Growth 
 
To examine this question, this paper examines 130 countries over various time frames from 
1970-2011, both resource-abundant and resource-scarce, to ascertain if resource-abundant 
countries utilize resources less efficiently than countries with a scarcity of resources. More 
importantly, this paper will break new ground in the literature through examining the 
institutional factors that may explain this disparity in usage, and ascertaining how key 
institutions may increase resource-use efficiency.  
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Theory: Does Abundance Lead to Waste? 
Economics is simply the science (or art) of scarcity, and how individuals, firms, and economies 
deal with the absence of infinity. But what happens in an environment when it appears that the 
laws of scarcity do not hold (at least in the short- or medium-term)? Luckily, these effects have 
been observed for decades in reference to the “soft budget constraint” (Kornai 1986), a situation 
where laws of scarcity are superseded by a greater force (normally a paternalistic government). 
The consequence of this, as noted by Robinson and Torvik (2009: 787), is such that “enterprises 
or agencies have incentives to act in inefficient or profligate ways knowing that they will be 
bailed out if things go wrong.” These “inefficient ways” pervade the firm at every level, 
including in production methods and use of inputs: “if the budget constraint is hard, the firm has 
no other option but to adjust… by improving quality, cutting costs, introducing new products or 
new processes… if, however, the budget constraint is soft such productive efforts are no longer 
imperative” (Kornai 1986: 10). The results of this were all-too-apparent apparent in the Soviet 
Union and its associated satellite states, where not only did firms survive long beyond their sell-
by date (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 2003), but incentives for quality and cost minimization 
were absent due to social ownership, leading to inefficiently produced and unwanted products.1  
 
Relevant for this paper, and as noted by Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003), soft budget 
constraints do not only pertain to government or financial institution bailouts, but can occur in a 
variety of situations. Indeed, natural resource abundance could provide a similar soft budget 
constraint in the short- and medium-term. Generally, resource abundance (and in particular, 
sudden resource abundance or discoveries) alter the effect of prices on the decision-making of 
the firm in regards to its inputs, shifting a firm’s demand curve closer to vertical (as Kornai 
(1986) notes). Indeed, given rapid advances in technology or resource discoveries, the soft 
budget constraint could occur overnight: until the advent of internal combustion, oil was fairly 
                                                          
1 In the words of American humorist P.J. O’Rourke, “A huge totalitarian system has been brought to its knees 
because nobody wants to wear Bulgarian shoes. “ 
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underutilized. This transformative effect of technology coupled with resource abundance 
(Smulders 2005) could lead to the constraints on an economy becoming quickly relaxed, and 
perhaps to natural resource waste and inefficiency vis a vis countries that have fewer natural 
resources.  
 
This hypothesis follows on from the effects of natural resource abundance that have already been 
observed empirically. The biggest effect, as Auty and Gelb (2001:2) note, is that “natural 
resource-abundance tends to undermine investment efficiency whereas a resource-poor 
endowment places a premium on efficiency.” Given that investment is but a second-order effect 
of a resource boom, it would make sense that the actual first-order effect of a resource boom, i.e. 
the usage of resources, would also have its efficiency undermined. This effect has also been 
observed in relationship to the effect that resources has on prudent macroeconomic management; 
in the words of Gylfason (2001:848), “incentives to create wealth tend to become too blunted by 
the ability to extract wealth from the soil or the sea.” Thus, we would expect to see the same 
effect that relaxes constraints on prudent policies to also lead to a relaxation of efficiency: if 
everything is availability at all times, and scarcity is no longer a very real threat, there is less of 
an incentive to economize. 
 
Institutional Factors Encouraging Efficiency 
There has been much recent scholarship on the relationship between institutional factors and the 
“resource curse,” focusing on political institutional quality (Bulte, Damania, and Deacon 2005; 
Sachs and Warner 2001; Torvik 2002; Wick and Bulte 2006, Cabrales and Hauk 2010) and the 
interplay of resource abundance and institutions. This work, however, has almost exclusively 
focused on two separate issues: the impact of the resource curse on the quality of institutions, 
and the impact of institutions on “escaping the curse” via growth. But are there institutional 
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factors that can push back against the “sloth” of Sachs and Warner (1995), the reality that 
resource abundance can encourage resource use inefficiency?  
 
Institutions can indeed matter for resource efficiency, and for the same reasons that 
“appropriate” institutions may temper the resource curse and lead to growth: by more closely 
aligning incentives for resource use efficiency with market costs, encouraging conservation of 
materials and moving firms towards a more efficient production frontier. However, to date, there 
has been comparatively little to no examination of institutions on resource usage, apart from 
Deacon and Mueller (2006) and empirical work done by Coursey and Hartwell (2000) and 
Hartwell and Coursey (2015), which found that economic freedom in a broad sense correlated 
with better environmental and public health indicators, including resource usage, over the period 
1960-1992.  
 
In order to delve into the question of the relationship between resource usage and institutions in a 
resource-abundant country, we thus need to examine the types of institutions in an economy that 
might have the greatest influence on resource usage. At a theoretical level, which institutions 
could tame the resource beast and encourage efficiency, even in a land of plenty? Following 
from the taxonomy of institutions in Hartwell (2013), this paper focuses on both political 
institutions (which, as in Acemoglu et. al 2005, are concerned explicitly with power distribution 
in a society) and economic institutions (which are “designed or arise explicitly to facilitate or 
hinder economic outcomes” (Hartwell 2013: 20)); this taxonomy is similar to Kolstad’s (2010) 
examination of the institutions that matter for the resource curse, but is more in line with tenets 
of the new institutionalist economics literature.  
 
Most of the focus in the extant literature has been on the mediating effect of political institutions 
in the presence of resource abundance (see, for example, Cabrales and Hauk 2010) and the 
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feedback effects that resources have on institutional development. Resource abundance has been 
linked to many negative attributes of government, including larger public sectors (Robinson et. 
al 2006), overextended public finances (Auty and Gelb 2001), and, as noted above, increased 
levels of corruption in the government (Alkhater 2012). Additionally, as mentioned earlier, there 
is a greater incentive for government to intervene in investment decisions in a resource-abundant 
environment, using “resource rents to relax market discipline” (Auty and Gelb: 135), which then 
results in inefficient investment. Given this tendency, it is perhaps too much to look for effective 
political institutions that can lead to resource efficiency, if they cannot even utilize the resources 
that are given for growth.  
 
However, the resource curse literature has also identified the existence of political institutions 
that are correlated overcoming the paradox of plenty. The most important paper in this vein 
comes from Andersen and Aslaksen (2008), who find that parliamentary systems help to insulate 
against the negative effects of resource abundance. The factor that may be driving this result is 
the concept of political (and especially executive) constraints, which a parliamentary system has 
built into its very make-up and that a presidential system lacks: mechanisms, such as votes of 
confidence and regular elections, that constrain the government from engaging in too much 
intervention in the marketplace, thus distorting market prices and causing misallocation of 
resources. As Torvik (2009:247) notes, “while presidentialism may be more of a ‘one man show’ 
that can be captured by special interests, parliamentary regimes… may be suited to putting 
proceeds from resources into productive use.”  
 
The extension from this empirical reality in regards to growth to the realm of resource efficiency 
is thus not a far stretch. Indirectly, a more restrained government correlates with higher growth 
(see Hartwell 2013), which is also correlated with better resource usage (Coursey and Hartwell 
2000). But more directly, if an unconstrained government encourages soft budget constraints and 
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investment inefficiency, it is most likely also encouraging production that is less efficient than 
would be under proper market signals. As Auty and Gelb (2001: 133) note, time horizons for 
governments are compressed due to resource abundance, with “projects undertaken by resource-
rich government…value[d] for their immediate income-generating effects rather than their 
growth-enhancing potential.” The presence of soft budget constraints and push from government 
to show immediate impact means a correspondingly lower emphasis on materials-use efficiency.   
 
Under such a plausible (and indeed realistic and all-too-frequent) scenario, a more-restrained 
government, one that is less focused on rent-extraction, redistribution of resources, or buying off 
special interests through political investment, would also be less distorting when it comes to 
resource usage. This point is made by Alkhater (2012:41) about democracy more generally, 
where he notes that a “government [which] is presumably held directly accountable for its 
actions by the electorate… restrains abusive resource exploitation and expropriation by the 
state.” This point holds for constraints on the government in general, as fewer distortions of 
market signals should lead to more incentives for resource efficiency. Finally, as Hartwell and 
Coursey (2000) note, the constraints on governments derive from the governed, and a more 
constrained executive is likely to be held accountable if the polity demands better environmental 
outcomes.  
 
Just as political institutions may operate to hinder or encourage resource efficiency, it is equally 
if not more plausible that there may be economic institutions that are more important in the 
determination of resource usage. Economic institutions, more concerned with economic 
incentives, can have a direct impact upon firm-level decisions for use of inputs, altering the 
calculations made by managers and businesses on efficiency (especially in an environment of 
abundance) and lengthening time horizons. This would provide a more direct channel for firms 
and, by extension, economies than government policies, which can take a longer time to work 
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their way through the economy. There is already some evidence for this supposition in regards to 
the resource curse, as Kolstad (2010) finds that private sector institutions are relatively more 
important than public ones for ameliorating the effects of resource abundance.  
 
If economic institutions can exert more of an influence on materials use efficiency than political 
ones, then theoretically, the most important economic institution would appear to be property 
rights, as their existence or lack would exert an influence on both sustainable extraction and 
utilization. In the first instance, clear property rights would create a secure claim of the 
individual to a resource stock, stabilizing the economic relations between resource owners and 
consumers of the resource (Knoepfel et al. 2007). Through this establishment of ownership of a 
resource, property rights would thus avoid the “tragedy of the commons” as formulated by 
Hardin (1968), where resources are “unowned or politically controlled,” a situation that 
frequently leads to such resourcing being “more apt to be inadequately managed” (Adler 
2000:668). Indeed, such a lack of ownership (i.e. property rights) would tend to encourage waste, 
as timing of extraction and use becomes more crucial than efficiency, in order to obtain the 
resource before someone else does. As Kronenberg (2008:787) notes, “under uncertain property 
rights, the resource owner will have an incentive to extract the resource more quickly than the 
social optimum would require;” Deacon and Mueller (2006:123) second this point, stating that 
“[if] the individual’s claim to a resource stock’s future can be rendered insecure… this reduces 
the payoff to natural resource conservation, leading to more rapid depletion of resource stocks.” 
Thus, in a Coasean (1960) framework, the existence of extensive property rights may encourage 
the better usage of natural resources through alignment of incentives and costs (also noted by de 
Soto 2000), increasing payoffs to conservation and channeling resources to more efficient usage.  
 
Moreover, property rights may not only be thought of as a defense against encroachment on 
resources, but also as an enabler of production and innovation. With government expropriation 
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held at bay and property rights secure, private business may flourish and grow (Demsetz 1982, 
Djankov et al. 2002), creating a competitive market for goods and services (Hartwell and 
Coursey 2015). In such an environment, resource efficiency will be crucial as a way to reduce 
production costs and increase profits, creating an incentive for firms to innovate and 
dematerialize rather than lose customers and money to competitors. Finally, secure property 
rights may also allow for critically reducing the demand for particular resources, as exploration 
and innovation can generate substitutes for inputs; in the excellent phrasing of Perraton 
(2006:644), “changes in technology and patterns of demand make previously essential resources 
obsolete, whereas others assume center stage: the Stone Age didn't end from a shortage of stones, 
and before the 20th century there were few uses for oil.” 
 
Data and Methodology 
To test the hypothesis regarding political and economic institutions improving resource usage, I 
have amassed a database that builds on the one created in Coursey and Hartwell (2000). That 
earlier database went only from 1960-1992 and suffered from the omission of many of the (now- 
and then-) transitioning economies, including Russia. The database for this paper rectifies this 
omission and covers commodity and energy production and consumption, relevant 
macroeconomic variables, and, most importantly, institutional variables for up to 130 countries 
from 1970-2011 (data availability by resource shifting the number of observations and cross-
sections across models). 
 
The basic econometric model, building on the hypotheses noted above, postulates energy 
efficiency as a function of resource abundance, macroeconomic and structural variables, and 
institutional factors, as noted in the previous section: 
 
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛾𝛽𝑒𝑀𝛾𝛾𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑖 +  𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛼𝛽𝛼𝛽𝛾𝛽𝛼𝑀𝛾𝛼𝑖𝑖−1 +  𝜀𝑖 
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The energy efficiency variables represented by Y in Equation 1 above include consumption of 
electricity, oil, natural gas, and paper (described in Table 1). To capture this resource use-
intensity variable, two different methods are utilized: where direct consumption data is available, 
it is divided by GDP to get a measure of unit consumption per unit of GDP (direct consumption 
data is available for oil, gas, and electricity) Alternately, where direct consumption data is not 
available (as with paper), I use Malenbaum’s (1978) “apparent consumption” measure, defined 
as the total production of raw material Y minus total exports plus total imports, divided by GDP. 
Given the scale of these numbers, they are log-transformed here. 
TABLE 1 – Dependent Variables and Sources 
Indicator Definition Source 
Intensity Indicators 
Electricity Usage Electricity consumption (billion Kilowatthours) divided by GDP CEIC 
Natural Gas Usage Gas consumption (billions of cubic feet) divided by GDP CEIC 
Oil Usage Oil consumption (thousands of barrels per day) divided by GDP CEIC 
Paper Usage 
"Apparent Consumption" of Paper, defined as 
production of paper and imports of paper, less 
exports (all in tonnes), divided by GDP 
FAOStat, World Bank WDI 
 
On the right hand side of Equation 1, defining resource abundance remains a subject of 
controversy in the literature. Sachs and Warner (1995 and 2001) were the first to define resource 
abundance as the resource intensity of exports, calculated as the value of exports of a resource in 
country i divided by GDP, a metric which has been used in countless other papers since (see, for 
example, Mehlum et al. 2006, and James and Aadland 2011).2 However, Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte (2008) have noted, this formulation is problematic for several reasons. In the first instance, 
export intensity may not capture resource abundance per se, but more likely captures resource 
dependence, an endogenous measure that “is not independent of economic policies and the 
                                                          
2 The working paper version of this article also utilized this measure as a gauge of resource abundance. 
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institutions that produce them” (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008:249).3 Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte’s (2009) develop this argument further to show that resource dependence is endogenous 
with conflict, a major consideration given the relationship between resources and civil strife. Van 
der Ploeg (2011) also highlights the endogeneity issue from a growth perspective, noting that the 
export-based measure of abundance has unclear causality, in that low incomes may cause more 
reliance on resources (rather than the other way around).4 But even from a purely trade-oriented 
standpoint, resources may also be an intermediate good (processed, then exported) that may 
skew the sense of a country’s “abundance” if one relies solely on export-intensity. As Manzano 
and Rigobon (2006) note, resource dependence may also be driven by other, unobservable, 
issues related to trade and trade policy. 
 
To guard against these issues, our empirical specification thus utilizes an alternate measure for 
resource abundance, that of resource production (on the theory that what does not exist cannot be 
mined or utilized). While using annual production data would be subjected to technology and 
other commodity price shocks, I instead utilize the initial level of the log of production of each 
resource for each country as the measure of resource abundance, as used in inter alia Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh (2004), Stijns (2005), and Brunnschweiler (2008).5 The use of initial indicators as a 
consistent measure of abundance is in line with Gylfason (2001) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2008), who show that cumulative resource extraction over a twenty- or thirty-year period (i.e. 
between 1970 and 2000) does not alter the relative resource abundance of a country. Indeed, 
Brunnschweiler (2008) shows that the countries with the highest production of a resource in the 
early 1970s still had the highest stock of that same resource by the late 1990s.  
 
                                                          
3 Participants in a seminar at the Bank of Estonia, as well as an anonymous referee, also made this point regarding 
abundance versus dependence. 
4 It should be noted that this empirical specification would suffer less from reverse causality than a growth 
regression, as it is more theoretically plausible that resource abundance would have effects on resource efficiency 
than efficiency would have on resource abundance or dependence. 
5 In theory, this should be in 1970, but where data is missing for a specific country, the earliest year with 
production data is used. 
12 
 
While the purpose of this paper is to measure if specific abundance (i.e. in one resource) leads to 
inefficiency in that same resource, there may be some merit, as in Atkinson and Hamilton 
(2003), to examining the effects of overall abundance.  To this end, we include as a check on the 
production data the percentage of GDP derived from natural resource rents; theoretically, it is 
possible to envision a scenario where all-around largess, as a source of income, then makes 
inefficiency the norm across all resources. 
 
In regards to the macroeconomic and structural controls, there is a long list of plausible variables 
that may be linked to institutional development, growth, and, most importantly, materials use or 
dematerialization. Gassebner et al. (2011) offer a tour of some of the most prominent drivers of 
environmental outcomes writ large, many of which would also apply to dematerialization. 
However, as our variable of interest is environmental efficiency, the extant literature on the 
resource curse offers little assistance to the most important controls, focused as it is on the 
institutional and resource drivers of growth. For this, we must turn to the environmental 
economics literature for clues as to the drivers of materials usage. In the first instance, it has been 
proven empirically that environmental cleanliness is correlated with higher levels of economic 
progress (Lopez 1994, Canas 2003, Narayan and Narayan 2010); to capture this effect, we 
include the (log) level of current GDP per capita as a proxy for development and technology 
effects. However, a Kuznets Curve relationship between environmental indicators and income 
has also been amply demonstrated in the prior literature, where environmental degradation 
increases at lower levels of growth and tapers off once a certain income threshold is attained (see 
Grossman and Krueger 1995, Dasgupta et al. 2002, Carson 2010, or Pao and Tsai 2010). In order 
to capture these effects, the empirical specification utilized here will include the square of GDP 
per capita as an additional control.6    
 
                                                          
6 Thanks are due to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point. 
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[Table 2 here] 
 
Beyond growth levels, there are many other plausible country-specific drivers of materials use 
intensity, especially if we conceptualize these drivers “as those factors that exert influence on 
human activities to use resources” (Steger and Bleischwitz 2011:816). A complete list of control 
variables is shown in Table 2, but some prominent covariates should be highlighted. In 
particular, trade is often conjectured to have an ambiguous effect on environmental outcomes, as 
it may increase resource allocation but at the same time cause “dirtier” industries to move to 
countries with lax environmental standards (Birdsall and Wheeler 1993). In regards to 
dematerialization, empirical evidence has shown that trade has a positive effect, as specialization 
in exports from developing to advanced economies is characterized by much lower 
“environmental consumption” (Rice 2007); similarly, trade and dematerialization may have 
some feedback effects, as dematerialization in one country can lessen demand for resources and 
resource-intensive goods from trading partners, spurring on dematerialization elsewhere 
(Muradian and Martinez-Alier 2001). As in many other papers (Yanikkaya 2003 gives an 
excellent overview), trade openness is proxied here as the (log) sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services as a share of GDP.7  
 
Given that global financial flows may also have a similar impact as trade in goods on 
dematerialization (i.e. providing discipline on resource use and encouraging efficiency), we 
include net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows as a control (as in Antweiler et al. 2001 and 
Gassebner et al. 2011). Domestic investment has also been found in the growth literature to be a 
deterrent of the “resource curse” (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004, Mehlum et. al 2006) in 
environments with good institutions (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003). We would expect domestic 
                                                          
7 There is also empirical evidence that increased trade in services correlates with resource-use efficiency (Taskin 
and Zaim 2001). While I do not differentiate here, this is an interesting avenue for future research. 
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investment to have the same disciplining effect as FDI, and be positively correlated with 
dematerialization, and thus the investment share of GDP is included.   
 
Several other structural issues in the economy may also play a role in the determination of 
material use efficiency, and additional controls may be relevant for different resources (Table 2). 
Given this large set of plausible controls and the reality of model uncertainty, I will utilize 
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) techniques, as introduced by Fernandez et al. (2001), to help 
reduce the set of controls to only the most promising relationships. To my knowledge, the only 
study that has used such an approach in regards to environmental outcomes is Begun and Eicher 
(2008), who examine the determinants of SO2 emissions. By introducing BMA analysis to the 
examination of materials use efficiency, this paper will break new econometric ground and allow 
for a more parsimonious model of drivers of dematerialization in the presence of abundance.8   
 
Finally, the institutional indicators utilized here include, as noted above, property rights and 
political constraints, which will be measured in a variety of ways. Property rights have been 
touched upon empirically in the resource literature (see Baggio and Papyrakis 2010 for a recent 
example), but have not been extensively tested as a determinant of resource efficiency apart from 
their inclusion in general economic freedom (see Coursey and Hartwell 2000) or in relation to 
broader environmental outcomes (Hartwell and Coursey 2015). This paper breaks new ground by 
including property rights via the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) “Investment Profile” 
indicator, a summation of three sub-components (Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits 
Repatriation, and Payment Delays) coded from 0 to 12, with higher values signifying greater 
protection of private property.  
                                                          
8 The BMA model utilized in this paper is based upon the priors and sampling mechanism of Magnus et. al (2010), 
assuming a base form of 𝑦 =  𝑊𝛽 +  𝑍𝑍 +  𝑣. This specification thus incorporates a linear classical Gaussian 
model, non-informative priors for the β coefficient (as well as in the error variance v), and a multivariate Gaussian 
prior for δ (as described in Dardanoni et. al 2012).  
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As noted above, given the governmental issues that come with resource abundance, checks and 
balances could act as a deterrent to waste and encourage more judicious use of resources in 
natural resource-rich countries. Here I will use two separate indicators to recognize political 
constraints or the lack of them: 
 
• The simplest proxy for ascertaining political influence in a country is the size of 
government as a percentage of GDP, used here as an objective measure for (lack of) 
political constraints. The same logic we apply to the resource abundance/usage nexus 
should also hold for government: a bigger government means more chance for rent-
seeking, more access points for political interests in the policy process, or simply a bigger 
tax bill that requires rents from natural resources. 
• On the other hand, a more-constrained government may mean less ability for the 
government to introduce distortions. Political constraints more broadly will be taken from 
Henisz’s (2000) “political constraint” database, and “estimates the feasibility of policy 
change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a 
change in government policy).” The POLCONV indicator includes data on the veto 
power of the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and sub-federal entities, and is 
coded from 0 to 1 (with higher numbers meaning more constraint). 
 
In addition to these institutional variables, it is plausible that it is not just the level of political 
constraints, but the instability of institutions that makes a difference in the consumption of 
resources.9 To factor in this reality, I also utilize two variables for political stability as a 
robustness check; the first is the Polity IV “durable” indicator, which shows how long it has been 
                                                          
9 Many thanks to Olavi Miller of the Bank of Estonia for suggesting the inclusion of political instability.  
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(in years) since a regime change in a particular country, while the second is the 5-year rolling 
standard deviation of the political constraints indicator utilized above.10  
 
However, it is the relationship between institutions and resource abundance that is our question 
of interest (as in Mehlum et al. 2006). Does the presence of “good” institutions in a country 
blessed with resource abundance mitigate the usage of resources and make them more efficient? 
To test this question, I will also use interaction terms between each of the institutional terms with 
each separate measure of resource abundance (also as in Torvik 2009). Finally, given that 
institutional factors may take some time to work their way through the economy and impact on 
resource usage, institutions are lagged one year in Equation 1 to capture this reality.11  
 
In regards to the choice of estimator, as many others have explored (Mehlum et. al 2006) and as 
we show in Figure 1, the presence of resources can distort institutional development at the same 
time that institutions are influencing environmental outcomes. This issue of simultaneity has 
been addressed to this point in the literature using the seemingly unrelated estimator (SUR) of 
Zellner (1962), to account for the contemporaneous influence of institutions and resource usage 
on each other (see especially Gylfason and Zoega 2006). Indeed, our examination here is 
actually a system of equations formulated as the legs of the triangle in Figure 1, where: 
• Resource Abundance → Development of Institutions; 
• Resource Abundance → Economic Performance; and finally,  
• Institutions, Economic Performance, Resource Abundance → Resource Use Efficiency12 
 
                                                          
10 The durable indicator makes no judgment on the type of regime, merely on its stability; the judgment on the 
type of regime is provided by the other indicators noted above. Additionally, a BMA analysis is run on these two 
additional regressors but not reported here – the results are reflected in the controls utilized in the regressions 
below. 
11 Additional lags are also tested, see the results section below. 
12 This approach also incorporates Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke’s (2010) critique of Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2008) by fashioning a standard growth regression using openness, human capital, and other covariates found to 
be important for growth. 
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However, the SUR method assumes that the right-hand side regressors are exogenous, a fact that 
is unlikely in the case of institutional development (Eicher and Leukert 2009; Hartwell 2013), 
but also in regards to the resource dependence of an economy: Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) 
have credibly argued that resource dependence itself is endogenous to the underlying factors of 
an economy.13 An obvious way to account for this endogeneity would thus be to use three-stage 
least squares (3SLS), which will be used below as the estimator of the relationships between 
institutions and resource usage (as in Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009). In this examination, I 
treat resource abundance (dependence), the institutional variables, and the macroeconomic 
controls as endogenous, instrumenting them with lagged levels of institutions, initial levels of 
GDP, and the country- and time- specific attributes (which are entirely exogenous over this time 
frame, see Becker et. al 1994 for an early use of these attributes as instruments). 
 
While 3SLS may account for endogeneity effects, the estimator assumes homoscedasticity in the 
error terms of each constituent equation. In a large panel dataset such as the one assembled for 
this paper, heteroskedasticity is likely present. In order to correct for this reality, I utilize pair 
bootstrapped standard errors stratified by country, a technique which generates standard errors 
robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (and which are similar to clustering on the 
country variable, see Ando and Hodoshima 2007).14 This formulation, utilization of 3SLS with 
bootstrapped errors, has become standard in recent literature on natural resources, as seen in He 
(2006), Rausser et al. (2009), Liverpool-Tasie and Winter-Nelson (2011), and Panzone (2013).15 
The bootstrap approach also corrects for Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke’s (2010) critique of 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), which assumed homoscedasticity.  
                                                          
13 Earlier versions of this paper confirmed that the SUR method of accounting for the three equations did indeed 
suffer from endogeneity issues. 
14 The earlier working paper version of this paper utilized IV-GMM methods as a check against the 3SLS 
formulation specifically to deal with heteroskedasticity. However, with the advances in bootstrap theory and 
programming shown in papers such as Iglesias and Phillips (2012), a conscious decision was made in this version to 
retain the 3SLS framework for reasons of efficiency and consistency. 
15 In order to ensure small bias in our estimates, and given the large number of observations in most of our 
equations, the bootstrap for each equation has been set to between 1,000 and 2,500 repetitions, to correspond 
with the data size. This is keeping in line with the suggestion of Efron and Tibshirani (1994). 
18 
 
 
Finally, given the vast dispersion in resource abundance among countries, and in order to correct 
for outliers with substantial resource endowments, the 3SLS method will itself be checked by a 
quantile regression in the manner of Koenker and Bassett (1978). The quantile regression will 
enable us to discern the different rates of change that institutional quality would have at the 
upper and lower bounds of the conditional distribution. In order to deal with the issues of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, robust standard errors are utilized. 
   
Results 
The results of the econometric modeling are presented in Tables 3 through 9 below. In the first 
series of regressions, we seek to merely confirm the hypothesis that resource abundance does 
indeed lead to resource use inefficiency. To do this, I test a simple fixed-effects GLS 
specification that models resource intensity as a function of resource abundance and the initial 
level of GDP in 1970. The results of this exercise (Table 3) show that intensity indicators behave 
according to our theory across all of our resource indicators, with resource use per unit of GDP 
increasing in the presence of abundance. Indeed, using this simple regression tool, we see there 
is a relationship between having more of these natural resources and the use of that resource, 
with the strongest relationship for electricity and paper, and a smaller (although still significant) 
correlation for gas and oil. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Having established that there appears to be a relationship between abundance and use, we turn 
now to the more interesting system of equations, relating institutional factors to resource usage. 
As promised above, a BMA analysis is utilized in order to narrow down the set of control 
variables from the large number of plausible indicators shown in Table 2. The results of this 
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analysis are shown in Tables 4a and 4b and Tables 5a and 5b for the top-level equation of 
interest, relating environmental efficiency to abundance and institutions (Tables 4a and 4b shows 
the first measure of abundance, initial production, related to the two political variables, and 
Tables 5a and 5b shows the percentage of resource rents in GDP to the same variables). The 
criterion used here, to determine robust correlation with the outcome variable for the auxiliary 
regressors, was suggested by De Luca and Magnus (2011), and involves retaining auxiliary 
variables which have an absolute value of the  t-ratio over 1 (a fact that also satisfies the criteria 
that the two standard-error confidence intervals for a given variable does not include zero). The 
retained variables satisfying this criterion are shown in Tables 4 and 5; the practical result of this 
exercise means that a different control set will be applied in each resource regression. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 shows the results for the top-level 3SLS equations across all four resources, with 
Table 6 using initial level of production as the measure of resource abundance and Table 7 
instead using resource rents. While there are some outliers related to shifting sample sizes, the 
results are generally in line with the theory elucidated above, but mainly in regards to property 
rights. The results for political institutions are highly dependent upon the particular resource, 
with size of government being associated with less efficient usage in every resource but paper 
(perhaps larger governments are better at creating efficient demand for paper that they use so 
much of). When interacted with resource abundance, however, size of government leads to more 
efficiency in gas and oil, but less in paper in electricity; this could be due to the fact that oil and 
gas are often state-owned, and thus larger governments are able to invest more in such 
operations.  
 
Other political metrics also show some intriguing results, with political constraints showing the 
“correct” sign in regards to materials usage across all four resources, but only statistically 
significant in the case of paper and oil. The size of abundance mitigation in each instance is 
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dwarfed, however, by the scale of inefficiency that accompanies a lessening of political 
constraints, in some instances up to eight times larger than the effect of political constraints in 
the face of abundance (i.e. as seen in the paper intensity regression). Conversely, political 
durability appears to contribute to less efficiency in the face of resource abundance, even as 
more durable governments may mean stability and higher efficiency ceteris paribus. This theory 
is given some credibility by the behavior of the political volatility indicator, which shows that 
volatility in a resource abundant environment leads to more inefficiency, sometimes much more; 
for example, a one standard-deviation increase in political volatility over a 5-year window can 
increase inefficiency in gas usage by as much as 80 percent. 
 
While political institutions give conflicting results, on the other hand, across all resources shown 
in Table 6, higher (lagged) levels of property rights in the presence of resource abundance 
(captured in the interaction term) uniformly show a more efficient usage of that particular 
resource.16 Moreover, this result is consistent in terms of its statistical and economic significance 
across specifications; as an example, in regards to oil usage, property rights by itself is associated 
with better efficiency, with a one unit increase in the property rights index leading to an average 
six percent decrease in oil intensity (oil use per unit of GDP). But when interacted with resource 
abundance, better property rights also result in an additional improvement in efficiency of one 
percent, meaning that property rights do in fact have a moderating influence on the resource 
curse. Against some resource, property rights by themselves may encourage slightly less 
efficient usage (as is the case for natural gas), but across resources, the interaction of property 
rights and abundance has a consistent efficiency-improving effect. 
 
                                                          
16 Additional lags of the institutional variables, not reported here for reasons of space, found similar results in 
regards to both scale and statistical significance. Lags of up to ten years were used as a robustness check, and the 
results did not alter in any form, with the effect on usage across all resources halving from year 5 to year 10 for 
both institutions but remaining statistically significant. This also points to the reality that institutional changes have 
a bigger impact on resource usage in the years immediately preceding the change. 
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These results for both institutions show little change in Table 7, where an alternate indicator for 
resource abundance (resource rents to GDP) is utilized. Of political institutions, volatility ceases 
to be important for gas and electricity, while it paradoxically increases efficiency in oil and 
paper; this beneficial effect may be due to the fact that volatility in a generally resource-
dependent state may make a rapacious government less likely to arise (or, more accurately, less 
able to extract rents). Similarly, constrained governments in resource-dependent states show less 
efficiency across all resources, perhaps due to a similar effect, i.e. government control in 
resource-dependent states may force efficiency that would not occur in a government monopoly 
on its own. Property rights retain their importance in mitigating resource usage, with only the 
electricity regressions showing lower (or no) significance. On the whole, however, the influence 
of property rights is generally in favor of better resource usage, an effect that increases when 
resource abundance is taken into account. 
 
As a final check on these exhaustive results, Tables 8 and 9 shows the results of quartile 
regressions, robust to heteroskedasticity, for each of the full commodity models (using initial 
production), in order to isolate the effects of outliers (Table 8 use government share of the 
economy as the political institutional indicator, while Table 9 uses political constraints). While 
the issue of endogeneity may still be present here,17 these regressions allow another approach to 
examining the impact of institutions on the entire distribution of materials usage. The results 
obtained in the 3SLS regressions still hold, with property rights effects getting stronger the closer 
one gets to the upper bounds no matter which political institution is utilized. Conversely, 
political institutions appear to have a more powerful effect at lower quantiles, with significance 
decreasing as one moves closer to the upper bounds; as an example, a country in the 25th 
percentile would see a one percent change in the size of its government to GDP result in 
                                                          
17 Although econometric advances in modeling quantile regressions with endogeneity have made some strides 
recently (see Chernozhukov and Hansen 2008 or Powell 2013, who includes two-step GMM estimators), 
estimation of more than two endogenous treatment variables is still in its infancy. Thus, these results are included 
for illustrative robustness, although the exact precision of the estimates may be biased. 
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inefficiency increasing 3 percent, while a country in the 75th percentile would see a change of 
only 0.2 percent (and this effect is statistically insignificant). One the other hand, a one point 
change in property rights in the presence of resource abundance would lead to a 0.4 percent 
improvement in oil efficiency at the 25th percentile, but a 1 percentage point improvement at the 
75th percentile. This tale, of increasing important of property rights and lessening importance of 
political institutions, also appears to confirm the median results analysis shown in Tables 6 and 
7.    
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has examined the materials intensity of resource-abundant countries and the 
institutional factors that can encourage greater efficiency. Utilizing a 3SLS estimator and 
incorporating Bayesian techniques, a consistent theme on the importance of specific institutions 
emerged. In particular, the examination of institutional variables suggested that property rights 
can mitigate the usage of nearly all resources in an atmosphere of resource abundance, while 
certain political institutions are more resource- and situation-specific in encouraging efficiency. 
For resource-abundance countries, however, the results are clear that the improvement of 
property rights will lead to more environmentally-sustainable usage in specific resources. 
 
These results are only a first attempt to relate institutional quality and resource usage, rather than 
the other two legs of the triangle in Figure 1. A possible agenda for future research is thus 
closely aligned with the agenda of many an institutional economist, and that is to devise and test 
better quantitative measures for institutions that can be introduced. In particular, we may need a 
better measure of property rights, as the ICRG investor measure might be better understood as a 
measure of business activity instead of purely property rights; perhaps the objective indicator of 
“contract-intensive money,” used by Clague et. al (1997) and Hartwell (2013), measuring the 
23 
 
amount of money held outside of the formal banking sector, could be an effective proxy 
(constituent parts of this indicator were unfortunately severely limited given the long time-frame 
and broad sweep of countries examined in this paper). Other metrics for political constraints 
and/or bureaucratic governance quality would also be welcome, as perhaps there are specific 
political institutions that have a greater impact on specific resources (the distinction of point 
source and diffuse resources, as noted by Isham et. al 2005). As a first attempt, however, this 
paper has demonstrated a clear link between resource use intensity and institutions, a result that 
can be built on in the future. 
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Table 2 – List of Institutional, Macroeconomic, and Structural Controls 
Indicator Definition Proxy for Source 
Institutional Indicators 
Government share 
All government current expenditures for purchases 
of goods and services (including compensation of 
employees), as a percentage of GDP 
Government intervention in markets/lack of 
executive constraints World Bank WDI 
Political Constraints 
The extent to which a change in the preferences of 
any one actor (including legislative, executive, 
judiciary, or sub-federal actors) may lead to a 
change in government policy 
Constrained government Henisz (2000) 
Investor Protection 
An assessment of the factors creating risk to 
investment, covering three subcomponents: 
Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits 
Repatriation, and Payment Delays  
Property Rights ICRG 
Abundance Variables 
Initial level of Production The level of production of the particular resource in the first available year of the data Resource abundance 
UNCTAD for oil, gas, electricity; 
FAOStat for paper 
Resource Rents 
Resource rents, computed as the sum of oil rents, 
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral 
rents, and forest rents, as a percentage of GDP 
Resource abundance World Bank WDI 
Macroeconomic and Structural Controls 
GDP (log) GDP in current dollars Development and technology effects World Bank WDI 
GDP^2 Square of (log) GDP Kuznets curve effects Author's calculation 
GDP 1970 (log) GDP in 1970 in then-current dollars Convergence effects/initial technology World Bank WDI 
Openness (log) Exports + Imports (current US$)/GDP (current US$) Trade CEIC 
FDI net Net inflows of foreign direct investment, as a percentage of GDP Foreign investment World Bank WDI 
Investment  Share of investment in GDP, % Domestic production Penn World Tables 
Secondary enrollment 
Total enrollment in secondary education, regardless 
of age, expressed as a percentage of the population 
of official secondary education age 
Human capital World Bank WDI 
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Indicator Definition Proxy for Source 
Urban population Percentage of a country's total population living in 
urban areas 
Aggolmeration effects; infrastructure World Bank WDI 
Population growth 
Percentage growth in total population, year on year 
Increased demand for materials World Bank WDI 
Population density Mid-year population divided by land area in square 
kilometer 
Spatial effects in materials usage World Bank WDI 
Industrial share Percentage of industry value added in GDP Industrial use of materials World Bank WDI 
Agricultural share Percentage of agriculture value added in GDP Agricultural use of materials World Bank WDI 
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TABLE 3 – Simple FE-GLS Model, Resource Use v. Resource Intensity 
  Gas Electricity Paper Oil 
  1 2 3 4 
Resource Abundance (initial level of 
production) 0.11 0.31 0.96 0.05 
  1.85* 3.43** 6.31** 1.72* 
Log GDP 1970 1.79 -2.88 -0.33 -0.16 
  12.90** 7.64** 2.59** 3.33** 
n 2143 4291 1854 2344 
R-squared 0.91 0.80 0.78 0.83 
country dummies? yes yes yes yes 
time dummies? yes yes yes yes 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level and ** at the 1% level. 
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Table 4a – BMA Results, Resource Abundance expressed as Initial Level of Production, Government Share of GDP 
Gas Electricity Paper Oil   
Variable t pip Variable t pip Variable t pip Variable t pip 
Focus variables 
Constant -3.04 1.00 Constant -15.73 1.00 Constant -3.03 1.00 Constant -3.52 1.00 
Investor Protection 5.32 1.00 Investor Protection 1.37 1.00 Investor Protection -0.25 1.00 Investor Protection -1.96 1.00 
Government share 3.37 1.00 Government share 2.82 1.00 Government share -3.52 1.00 Government share 9.68 1.00 
Property 
rights*Abundance -7.30 1.00 
Property 
rights*Abundance -5.52 1.00 
Property 
rights*Abundance -0.91 1.00 
Property 
rights*Abundance -4.77 1.00 
Government 
Share*Abundance -4.62 1.00 
Government 
Share*Abundance 4.52 1.00 
Government 
Share*Abundance 4.27 1.00 
Government 
Share*Abundance -7.86 1.00 
Abundance 11.64 1.00 Abundance 18.79 1.00 Abundance 1.55 1.00 Abundance 11.76 1.00 
GDP 1.84 1.00 GDP -0.09 1.00 GDP 0.11 1.00 GDP 1.15 1.00 
GDP^2 -0.22 1.00 GDP^2 -3.14 1.00 GDP^2 1.25 1.00 GDP^2 -1.14 1.00 
GDP 1970 -0.62 0.33 GDP 1970 -13.62 1.00 GDP 1970 -7.48 1.00 GDP 1970 -2.67 0.94 
Auxiliary variables 
Openness 0.81 0.45 Openness 9.79 1.00 Openness 6.80 1.00 Openness 6.18 1.00 
FDI net 0.16 0.05 FDI net -6.09 1.00 FDI net -2.87 0.96 FDI net -2.73 0.95 
Investment  -2.54 0.93 Investment  -0.29 0.10 Investment  0.20 0.07 Investment  1.37 0.73 
Secondary enrollment 1.17 0.65 Secondary enrollment 1.13 0.63 Secondary enrollment -3.1 0.98 
Secondary 
enrollment -0.11 0.04 
Urban population 0.26 0.10 Urban population 1.32 0.71 Urban population 0.25 0.09 Urban population -0.01 0.03 
Population growth 0.18 0.06 Population growth 0.13 0.04 Population growth 0.07 0.04 Population growth -0.03 0.03 
Population density 6.65 1.00 Population density -0.11 0.03 Population density -0.65 0.35 Population density 0.03 0.04 
Industrial share 6.39 1.00 Industrial share 2.23 0.90 Industrial share 0.20 0.07 Industrial share 0.30 0.12 
Agricultural share 0.18 0.06 Agricultural share 4.20 1.00 Agricultural share -0.25 0.09 Agricultural share 10.50 1.00 
Shaded boxes indicate variable is above threshold. 
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Table 4b – BMA Results, Resource Abundance expressed as Initial Level of Production, Political Constraints 
Gas Electricity Paper Oil   
Variable t pip Variable t pip Variable t pip Variable t pip 
Focus variables 
Constant -1.62 1.00 Constant -13.72 1.00 Constant -1.11 1.00 Constant -3.46 1.00 
Investor Protection 3.23 1.00 Investor Protection 1.42 1.00 Investor Protection -0.97 1.00 Investor Protection -0.25 1.00 
Political Constraints 3.59 1.00 Political Constraints -0.15 1.00 Political Constraints 7.83 1.00 Political Constraints -0.93 1.00 
Property 
rights*Abundance -4.92 1.00 
Property 
rights*Abundance -5.66 1.00 
Property 
rights*Abundance -0.14 1.00 
Property 
rights*Abundance -0.73 1.00 
Political 
Constraints*Abundanc
e 
-3.34 1.00 
Political 
Constraints*Abundanc
e 
-1.69 1.00 
Political 
Constraints*Abundan
ce 
-8.49 1.00 Political Constraints*Abundance 1.54 1.00 
Abundance 12.74 1.00 Abundance 32.03 1.00 Abundance 6.03 1.00 Abundance 4.40 1.00 
GDP 0.96 1.00 GDP -0.17 1.00 GDP -0.75 1.00 GDP 3.06 1.00 
GDP^2 1.00 1.00 GDP^2 -3.17 1.00 GDP^2 1.21 1.00 GDP^2 -2.30 1.00 
GDP 1970 
-2.13 
0.89 GDP 1970 -12.42 1.00 GDP 1970 -5.83 1.00 GDP 1970 -0.05 0.04 
Auxiliary variables 
Openness 0.41 0.18 Openness 10.88 1.00 Openness 7.52 1.00 Openness 0.59 0.31 
FDI net 0.08 0.04 FDI net -5.85 1.00 FDI net -4.05 1.00 FDI net 0.05 0.03 
Investment  -2.13 0.89 Investment  -0.89 0.50 Investment  -0.10 0.04 Investment  -0.04 0.03 
Secondary enrollment 0.77 0.42 Secondary enrollment 1.79 0.83 Secondary enrollment -0.24 0.08 Secondary enrollment 0.13 0.05 
Urban population 1.10 0.60 Urban population 0.63 0.33 Urban population -0.14 0.05 Urban population 0.07 0.04 
Population growth 0.57 0.29 Population growth 0.05 0.03 Population growth -0.14 0.04 Population growth -0.23 0.08 
Population density 6.02 1.00 Population density -0.15 0.04 Population density -0.36 0.15 Population density 10.34 1.00 
Industrial share 5.19 1.00 Industrial share 1.16 0.64 Industrial share -0.27 0.10 Industrial share 1.64 0.80 
Agricultural share -0.25 0.09 Agricultural share 3.59 0.99 Agricultural share 0.09 0.04 Agricultural share -4.13 0.99 
Shaded boxes indicate variable is above threshold. 
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Table 5a – BMA Results, Resource Abundance expressed as Resource Rents to GDP, Government Share of GDP 
Gas Electricity Paper Oil   
Variable t pip Variable t pip Variable t pip Variable t pip 
Focus variables 
Constant -5.36 1.00 Constant -17.55 1.00 Constant -4.38 1.00 Constant -12.37 1.00 
Investor Protection -0.30 1.00 Investor Protection -4.42 1.00 Investor Protection -3.13 1.00 Investor Protection -10.89 1.00 
Government share 2.17 1.00 Government share 5.95 1.00 Government share 4.76 1.00 Government share 5.95 1.00 
Property 
rights*Resource Rents -4.07 1.00 
Property 
rights*Resource Rents -1.44 1.00 
Property 
rights*Resource 
Rents 
-2.76 1.00 Property rights*Resource Rents -2.39 1.00 
Government 
Share*Resource Rents -6.46 1.00 
Government 
Share*Resource Rents -5.43 1.00 
Government 
Share*Resource 
Rents 
-3.08 1.00 Government Share*Resource Rents -4.78 1.00 
Resource Rents 9.01 1.00 Resource Rents 2.45 1.00 Resource Rents -0.91 1.00 Resource Rents 4.91 1.00 
GDP 3.07 1.00 GDP 6.86 1.00 GDP 1.1 1.00 GDP 6.80 1.00 
GDP^2 0.04 1.00 GDP^2 -6.82 1.00 GDP^2 -0.44 1.00 GDP^2 -7.03 1.00 
GDP 1970 0.26 0.09 GDP 1970 0.06 0.03 GDP 1970 -3.86 0.99 GDP 1970 -0.48 0.23 
Auxiliary variables 
Openness 0.14 0.05 Openness 7.27 1.00 Openness 4.59 1.00 Openness 5.68 1.00 
FDI net 0.73 0.40 FDI net -5.05 1.00 FDI net -2.37 0.92 FDI net -1.80 0.84 
Investment  0.06 0.03 Investment  0.03 0.03 Investment  -0.28 0.10 Investment  3.42 0.98 
Secondary enrollment 0.34 0.14 Secondary enrollment 4.70 1.00 Secondary enrollment -0.27 0.10 Secondary enrollment -0.29 0.11 
Urban population 0.05 0.04 Urban population 0.85 0.48 Urban population -0.1 0.05 Urban population 0.58 0.30 
Population growth -0.20 0.06 Population growth -4.82 1.00 Population growth 0.06 0.03 Population growth -0.10 0.03 
Population density 8.64 1.00 Population density -0.63 0.33 Population density -1.04 0.59 Population density -0.15 0.04 
Industrial share 3.34 0.98 Industrial share 6.61 1.00 Industrial share 10.80 1.00 Industrial share -0.04 0.03 
Agricultural share -0.38 0.16 Agricultural share 6.34 1.00 Agricultural share 2.72 0.95 Agricultural share 0.62 0.34 
Shaded boxes indicate variable is above threshold. 
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Table 5b – BMA Results, Resource Abundance expressed as Resource Rents to GDP, Political Constraints 
Gas Electricity Paper Oil 
  
Variable t pip Variable t pip Variable t pip Variable t pip 
Constant -4.51 1.00 Constant -16.41 1.00 Constant -6.07 1.00 Constant -10.72 1.00 
Focus variables 
Investor Protection -1.62 1.00 Investor Protection -6.06 1.00 Investor Protection -4.45 1.00 Investor Protection -10.88 1.00 
Political Constraints -3.68 1.00 Political Constraints -0.46 1.00 Political Constraints -3.91 1.00 Political Constraints -7.51 1.00 
Property 
rights*Resource Rents -1.33 1.00 
Property 
rights*Resource Rents 1.20 1.00 
Property 
rights*Resource Rents -1.33 1.00 
Property 
rights*Resource Rents -1.01 1.00 
Political 
Constraints*Resource 
Rents 
4.24 1.00 
Political 
Constraints*Resource 
Rents 
4.97 1.00 
Political 
Constraints*Resource 
Rents 
2.10 1.00 
Political 
Constraints*Resource 
Rents 
4.86 1.00 
Resource Rents 3.95 1.00 Resource Rents -3.69 1.00 Resource Rents -5.47 1.00 Resource Rents -0.42 1.00 
GDP 2.75 1.00 GDP 6.07 1.00 GDP 1.04 1.00 GDP 5.30 1.00 
GDP^2 -0.10 1.00 GDP^2 -6.07 1.00 GDP^2 -0.12 1.00 GDP^2 -5.53 1.00 
GDP 1970 -0.03 0.03 GDP 1970 -0.17 0.05 GDP 1970 -2.10 0.90 GDP 1970 -0.34 0.34 
Auxiliary variables 
Openness 0.31 0.12 Openness 7.90 1.00 Openness 5.20 1.00 Openness 7.96 1.00 
FDI net 0.19 0.06 FDI net -5.64 1.00 FDI net -2.25 0.91 FDI net -2.99 0.96 
Investment  0.11 0.04 Investment  -0.19 0.06 Investment  -0.14 0.05 Investment  4.48 1.00 
Secondary enrollment 2.04 0.86 Secondary enrollment 4.50 1.00 Secondary enrollment -0.10 0.04 Secondary enrollment 0.03 0.03 
Urban population 0.08 0.04 Urban population 1.59 0.79 Urban population -0.20 0.08 Urban population 2.47 0.96 
Population growth -0.25 0.09 Population growth -3.67 0.99 Population growth 0.02 0.03 Population growth -0.21 0.06 
Population density 8.37 1.00 Population density -0.53 0.26 Population density -1.92 0.86 Population density -0.22 0.07 
Industrial share 0.94 0.53 Industrial share 5.88 1.00 Industrial share 10.04 1.00 Industrial share -0.19 0.06 
Agricultural share -0.56 0.29 Agricultural share 6.26 1.00 Agricultural share 1.30 0.71 Agricultural share 0.75 0.41 
Shaded boxes indicate variable is above threshold.
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Table 6 – 3SLS Regressions Including Institutional Interaction Terms, Resource Use v. Resource 
Abundance (Initial Production) 
 
Gas Electricity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
INSTITUTIONAL Variables 
Political               
Government Share 0.05     0.004       
  6.10**     3.15**       
Government 
Share*Resource Abundance -0.01     0.004       
  8.37**     5.86**       
Political Constraints   0.72      -0.14     
    2.41*      2.67**     
Political 
Constraints*Resource 
Abundance  
  -0.08      -0.02     
    1.59      1.50     
Political Durability    0.01      -0.003   
     4.33**      4.75**   
Political Durability*Resource 
Abundance    -0.001      0.001   
     3.06**      5.74**   
5-year Political Volatility      -2.22       0.27 
       1.65*       1.35 
Volatility*Resource 
Abundance      0.80       0.23 
       3.35**       3.27** 
Economic               
Property Rights 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.12 -0.001 0.0060 -0.001 0.005 
  4.45** 4.42** 4.92** 2.91** 0.22 0.69 0.08 0.65 
Property Rights*Resource 
Abundance -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  7.11** 6.88** 6.12** 4.61** 6.04** 6.20** 6.54** 6.22** 
RESOURCE Variables 
Resource Abundance (log of 
initial production) 1.00 0.76 0.75 0.58 0.57 0.70 0.67 0.67 
  12.75** 15.96** 17.10** 9.58** 21.66** 31.21** 33.69** 33.57** 
MACRO Variables 
GDP 3.00 2.25 1.24 1.16 -0.10 -0.11 0.24 -0.10 
  10.64** 10.63** 3.99** 4.59** 0.91 1.00 2.02* 0.97 
GDP^2 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.002 -0.003 -0.01 -0.003 
  8.25** 6.62** 1.96* 2.32* 1.21 1.42 4.14** 1.41 
GDP 1970   -0.20 -0.06  -0.33 -0.32 -0.34 -0.33 
    4.43** 1.42  19.48** 17.79** 19.79** 17.69** 
Openness       0.24 0.29 0.29 0.27 
        11.33** 12.41** 12.58** 12.93** 
FDI net       -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
        7.07** 6.44** 6.37** 6.60** 
Investment  -0.02 -0.01 -0.008         
  7.04** 3.50** 2.95**         
Secondary enrollment 0.004    0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
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Gas Electricity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  4.54**    5.75** 6.73** 6.57** 5.48** 6.18** 
Urban population   0.003           
    3.57**           
Population density 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002         
  19.71** 23.69** 20.43** 17.41**        
Industrial share 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 
  14.50** 12.33** 15.33** 12.53** 4.67** 2.79** 3.38** 3.61** 
Agricultural share         0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 
          6.91** 6.95** 6.66** 7.33** 
C -47.12 -33.17 -21.30 -20.96 -11.54 -11.06 -15.01 -11.18 
  12.82** 11.48** 5.15** 6.54** 8.75** 8.01** 9.78** 8.15** 
n 917 1141 1119 916 1412 1411 1371 1405 
Partial R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
instruments Lag of All Institutional Variables, Initial Level of GDP, Country, Year 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level and ** at 
the 1% level. Results obtained via reg3 in Stata with 3sls. 
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Table 6 – 3SLS Regressions Including Institutional Interaction Terms, Resource Use v. Resource 
Abundance (Initial Production) continued 
 
Paper Oil 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
INSTITUTIONAL Variables 
Political               
Government Share -0.03     0.04       
  2.47*     7.52**       
Government 
Share*Resource Abundance 0.004     -0.007       
  2.93**     6.31**       
Political Constraints   0.49      0.58     
    3.24**      3.39**     
Political 
Constraints*Resource 
Abundance  
  -0.06      -0.10     
    5.19**      3.53**     
Political Durability    -0.001      -0.006   
     0.59      15.26**   
Political Durability*Resource 
Abundance    0.0001      0.0008   
     0.59      9.76**   
5-year Political Volatility      0.44       1.28 
       1.60       3.27** 
Volatility*Resource 
Abundance      0.01       -0.06 
       0.63       0.80 
Economic               
Property Rights -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 
  2.12* 2.02* 1.74* 1.39 3.72** 4.31** 5.33** 3.50** 
Property Rights*Resource 
Abundance -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 -0.01 -0.01 
  1.74* 2.37* 2.37* 2.46* 4.59** 0.50 5.86** 3.78** 
RESOURCE Variables 
Resource Abundance (log of 
initial production) 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.13 
  2.56** 11.10** 10.20** 12.13** 10.40** 5.95** 7.81** 7.49** 
MACRO Variables 
GDP -0.55 -0.60 -0.16 -0.28 0.71 -0.04 0.61 0.15 
  1.81* 2.78** 0.59 1.31 5.18** 0.22 3.80** 1.17 
GDP^2 0.02 0.02 0.008 0.01 -0.01 -0.002 -0.01 -0.004 
  2.71** 4.17** 1.54 2.56* 5.41** 0.68 3.58** 1.60 
GDP 1970 -0.33 -0.33 -0.35 -0.35 -0.07   -0.15   
  11.21** 10.71** 11.85** 11.76** 2.79**   6.67**   
Openness 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.24   0.21 0.31 
  12.37** 11.96** 13.37** 13.30** 5.55**   6.18** 10.69** 
FDI net -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01   -0.01 -0.01 
  3.65** 3.48** 3.31** 3.49** 2.71**   2.82** 3.44** 
Investment        0.004      
        2.79**      
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Paper Oil 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Secondary enrollment -0.003  -0.003 -0.003        
  4.39**  5.58** 5.41**        
Population density           -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 
          3.00** 8.00** 8.02** 
Industrial share           0.005 -0.007   
            2.16* 4.17**   
Agricultural share         0.02 0.02   0.02 
          11.16** 12.62**   15.05** 
C 0.51 0.12 -4.84 3.52 -20.71 -10.89 -16.28 -13.90 
  0.12 2.79** 1.38 1.25 12.02** 5.00** 7.90** 8.32** 
n 1028 1025 1028 1021 1031 953 988 1023 
Partial R-squared 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.54 
instruments Lag of All Institutional Variables, Initial Level of GDP, Country, Year 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level and ** at 
the 1% level. Results obtained via reg3 in Stata with 3sls. 
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TABLE 7 – 3SLS Regressions Including Institutional Interaction Terms, Resource Use v. 
Resource Rents 
 
Gas Electricity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
INSTITUTIONAL Variables 
Political              
Government Share 0.01     0.02      
  2.10*     7.18**      
Government Share*Resource 
Rents -0.002     -0.0009      
  7.28**     5.60**      
Political Constraints   -1.62      -0.06    
    6.79**      0.85    
Political Constraints*Resource 
Rents    0.08      0.03    
    8.11**      5.04**    
Political Durability    -0.003      -0.0001   
     5.42**      0.27   
Political Durability*Resource 
Rents     0.001      0.0002   
     9.09**      4.99**   
5-year Political Volatility      0.33      0.85 
       0.33      2.60** 
Volatility*Resource Rents      -0.02      -0.01 
       0.47      0.82 
Economic              
Property Rights 0.020 0.04 0.003 0.002 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 
  0.53 1.42 0.14 0.06 3.82** 4.64** 6.49** 4.30** 
Property Rights*Resource 
Rents -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0004 
  4.68** 1.14 4.34** 2.18* 2.41* 1.23 0.46 0.83 
RESOURCE Variables 
Resource Rents 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.008 -0.002 
  8.56** 3.97** 6.80** 4.68** 4.04** 3.99** 2.01* 0.57 
MACRO Variables 
GDP 0.90 -0.59 1.52 1.32 0.90 0.81 0.68 0.77 
  3.57** 2.33* 7.38** 5.44** 9.37** 7.39** 6.85** 7.85** 
GDP^2 0.001 0.03 -0.01 -0.008 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
  0.13 6.36** 2.62** 1.60 9.53** 7.55** 6.98** 8.03** 
GDP 1970              
               
Openness       0.26 0.29 0.28 0.28 
        7.65** 9.24** 8.76** 8.99** 
FDI net       -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
        5.02** 6.17** 4.94** 5.13** 
Investment               
               
Secondary enrollment   0.01    0.006 0.005 0.005 0.007 
    6.73**    9.62** 8.01** 6.84** 10.30** 
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Gas Electricity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Urban population         0.003    
          4.27**    
Population density 0.003   0.002 0.002       -0.0002 
  32.40**  28.20** 30.86**      5.82** 
Population Growth       -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 
        6.49** 5.28** 5.86** 5.35** 
Industrial share 0.05   0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  8.97**   6.15** 8.60** 7.95** 7.09** 6.69** 7.59** 
Agricultural share         0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
          8.99** 9.19** 8.16** 9.66** 
C -20.44 -0.88 -28.34 -25.46 -33.60 -32.02 -30.10 -31.51 
  6.38** 0.26 10.81** 8.30 26.20** 21.95** 23.28** 24.82** 
n 1209 1156 1486 1232 1411 1409 1606 1401 
Partial R-squared 0.57 0.54 0.58 0.56 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.22 
instruments Second Lag of All Institutional Variables, Initial Level of GDP, Country, Year 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level and ** at 
the 1% level. 
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TABLE 7 – 3SLS Regressions Including Institutional Interaction Terms, Resource Use v. 
Resource Rents (continued) 
 
Paper Oil 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
INSTITUTIONAL Variables 
Political              
Government Share 0.01     0.01      
  4.41**     7.60**      
Government 
Share*Resource Rents -0.0004     -0.0003      
  1.06     3.79**      
Political Constraints   -0.53      -0.72    
    7.15**      11.67**    
Political 
Constraints*Resource Rents    0.01      0.02    
    2.28*      6.32**    
Political Durability    0.0003      -0.005   
     1.12      19.84**   
Political Durability*Resource 
Rents     0.0003      0.001   
     5.28**      13.70**   
5-year Political Volatility      1.46      1.40 
       4.89**      5.61** 
Volatility*Resource Rents      -0.05      -0.04 
       3.04**      3.30** 
Economic              
Property Rights -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
  4.73** 5.82** 10.40** 8.88** 12.55** 11.47** 11.71** 10.93** 
Property Rights*Resource 
Rents -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  4.68** 3.61** 4.64** 1.59 1.45 1.31 4.23** 2.30* 
RESOURCE Variables 
Resource Rents -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.001 0.01 0.02 
  1.15 4.43** 3.75** 2.33* 4.33** 0.27 2.48* 4.25** 
MACRO Variables 
GDP 0.69 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.60 0.40 0.23 0.52 
  4.17** 3.45** 3.35** 6.89** 9.04** 5.69** 3.44** 7.42** 
GDP^2 -0.01 -0.008 -0.007 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.005 -0.01 
  2.91** 2.44* 2.11* 7.11** 9.41** 5.88** 3.51** 7.90** 
GDP 1970 -0.18 -0.12 -0.21 -0.02        
  6.09** 4.09** 10.00** 1.16        
Openness 0.33 0.38 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.21 
  11.53** 13.56** 9.26** 11.35** 8.22** 10.58** 10.30** 8.63** 
FDI net -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.006 -0.01 
  3.63** 3.45** 3.68** 2.75** 3.38** 3.70** 2.40* 3.50** 
Investment  -0.002     0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 
  1.17     6.23** 7.82** 5.68** 6.68** 
Urban population         0.003    
          7.60**    
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Paper Oil 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Population density -0.0004 -0.0005   -0.0003     -0.0005   
  7.19** 9.02**   8.93**     13.10**   
Industrial share 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.0001         
  9.23** 8.00** 9.61** 0.03         
Agricultural share 0.007 0.003   0.001         
  2.34* 1.19   0.93         
C -18.93 -18.27 -16.07 -17.89 -19.08 -16.49 -14.39 -17.97 
  9.10** 8.24** 7.53** 18.29** 22.78** 18.52** 17.14** 20.46** 
n 1102 1099 1462 1831 2218 2216 2169 2208 
Partial R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.28 
instruments Second Lag of All Institutional Variables, Initial Level of GDP, Country, Year 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level and ** at 
the 1% level.
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Table 8 – Quantile Regressions, Government Share of the Economy v. Initial Level of Production 
 
Gas Electricity Paper Oil 
  0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 
INSTITUTIONAL Variables 
Political                     
Government Share 0.03 -0.02 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
  2.82** 2.19* 0.16 0.60 2.23* 4.16** 2.65** 2.39* 3.01** 7.32** 7.35** 5.87** 
Government Share*Resource Abundance -0.01 -0.001 -0.01 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
  3.66** 0.40 2.45* 5.64** 3.99** 1.45 3.83** 2.82** 3.68** 4.64** 4.59** 2.51* 
Economic                     
Property Rights 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.005 -0.005 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
  2.27* 2.01* 3.05** 1.69* 0.75 0.63 1.84* 4.47** 2.31* 4.57** 3.33** 1.18 
Property Rights*Resource Abundance -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.008 -0.006 -0.01 -0.001 0.0002 -0.002 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  3.97** 4.17** 7.11** 3.67** 3.47** 4.43** 0.42 0.21 2.15* 5.37** 6.12** 4.82** 
RESOURCE Variables 
Resource Abundance 0.72 0.51 0.62 0.56 0.67 0.70 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.23 0.22 
  8.56** 7.28** 10.64** 16.37** 26.59** 20.70** 2.00* 3.39** 4.17** 10.53** 12.47** 9.70** 
MACRO Variables 
GDP 2.71 2.74 1.27 0.45 0.09 -0.24 -0.31 -0.56 -1.24 1.36 0.78 0.35 
  3.43** 5.27** 2.45* 2.65** 0.85 1.01 1.13 1.87* 4.19** 8.03** 3.81** 1.54 
GDP^2 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.006 0.0005 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.007 
  2.58** 4.31** 1.47 3.67** 2.71** 0.1 1.80* 2.69** 4.75** 7.90** 4.03** 1.58 
GDP 1970      -0.39 -0.46 -0.41 -0.24 -0.36 -0.31 -0.11 -0.03 -0.10 
       14.89** 20.85** 15.62** 6.08** 9.11** 8.85** 3.39** 0.85 2.34* 
Openness      0.16 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.23 0.21 0.27 
       5.59** 6.30** 8.59** 7.58** 9.07** 10.25** 6.38** 6.22** 7.58** 
FDI net      -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
       6.34** 4.27** 3.07** 2.11* 2.06* 1.90* 3.97** 2.86** 4.01** 
Investment  -0.02 -0.003 -0.005          0.007 0.004 0.0007 
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Gas Electricity Paper Oil 
  0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 
  2.09* 0.77 2.01*          4.18** 2.88** 0.24 
Secondary Enrollment 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005      
  1.35 2.12* 6.52** 2.32* 4.18** 4.16** 2.74** 3.64** 10.73**      
Urban population                    
                     
Population density 0.002 0.001 0.0005                 
  7.87** 8.50** 2.78**               
Industrial share 
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.007 0.008 0.007           
  4.49** 4.61** 2.88** 5.37** 6.29** 4.27**           
Agricultural share 
-0.003 -0.004 0.02 0.008 0.006 0.009      0.02 0.02 0.02 
  0.25 0.46 3.32** 3.79** 4.11** 4.19**      8.65** 8.25** 7.66 
C -42.08 -39.01 -19.85 -17.60 -11.24 -7.97 -4.33 1.40 10.19 -28.87 -21.91 -14.77 
  4.13** 5.67** 2.96** 7.85** 8.22** 2.70** 1.13 0.35 2.61** 13.31** 8.32** 4.76** 
n 965 965 965 1466 1466 1466 1062 1062 1062 1343 1343 1343 
Partial R-squared 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.31 0.31 0.29 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level and ** at the 1% level. Results obtained via qreg in Stata 
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Table 9 – Quantile Regressions, Political Constraints v. Initial Level of Production 
 
Gas Electricity Paper Oil 
  0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 
INSTITUTIONAL Variables 
Political                     
Political Constraints 1.94 0.73 0.64 0.15 0.05 -0.09 0.31 0.42 0.45 0.91 0.56 0.30 
  7.47** 2.90** 1.91* 2.39* 1.03 1.42 1.84* 3.25** 2.97** 7.18** 4.74** 2.38* 
Political Constraints*Resource Abundance -0.31 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.19 -0.12 -0.12 
  6.20** 3.16** 2.17* 5.19** 2.64** 2.06* 1.88* 4.97** 5.20** 8.40** 6.18** 5.96** 
Economic                     
Property Rights 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.001 -0.009 -0.01 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 
  1.71* 3.09** 2.62** 0.17 1.36 1.35 5.59** 7.19** 2.21* 6.34** 8.16** 5.32** 
Property Rights*Resource Abundance -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.009 -0.008 -0.02 0.0004 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.01 
  3.57** 5.76** 3.66** 3.66** 3.66** 4.93** 0.32 0.54 3.46** 1.80* 1.54 2.22* 
RESOURCE Variables 
Resource Abundance 0.75 0.61 0.51 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.17 0.17 
  14.09** 13.66** 9.89** 32.68** 39.08 27.91** 4.99** 9.71** 8.75** 11.24** 8.91** 8.33** 
MACRO Variables 
GDP 1.25 2.96 1.17 0.25 -0.13 -0.27 0.03 -0.63 -1.18 1.18 0.99 0.08 
  3.47** 7.40** 1.67* 1.56 1.06 1.89* 0.15 3.37** 5.56** 6.46** 4.28** 0.22 
GDP^2 -0.01 -0.04 -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 0.0004 0.004 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.004 
  1.70* 4.71** 0.66 2.94** 0.93 0.17 1.03 4.12** 6.07** 6.98** 4.78** 0.54 
GDP 1970 -0.17 -0.51 -0.21 -0.37 -0.43 -0.41 -0.35 -0.25 -0.23      
  1.42 8.20** 2.55* 14.53** 21.76** 15.05** 6.97** 7.93** 7.11**      
Openness      0.17 0.16 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.32      
       5.18** 7.02** 8.10** 6.25** 10.40** 9.58**      
FDI net      -0.009 -0.01 -0.007 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01      
       2.52* 4.51** 2.68** 6.23** 3.85** 6.63**      
Investment  0.003 0.006 -0.006               
  0.66 1.38 1.32               
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Gas Electricity Paper Oil 
  0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 0.25 Median 0.75 
Secondary Enrollment      0.0004 0.002 0.002          
       0.57 3.34** 3.24**          
Urban population 0.006 0.01 -0.003               
  1.70* 2.95** 0.99               
Population density 0.002 0.002 0.001            0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
  18.95** 16.74** 3.78**          17.72** 18.48** 14.47** 
Industrial share 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.003 0.007 0.007      -0.001 0.004 0.009 
  2.63** 4.34** 4.16** 1.97* 5.52** 4.71**      0.42 1.75* 3.82** 
Agricultural share -0.001 0.01 -0.01 0.004 0.005 0.007      0.01 0.02 0.02 
  0.13 1.16 1.05 2.66** 3.57** 3.04**      4.77** 7.56** 6.65** 
C -19.73 -37.33 -15.42 -15.04 -8.48 -7.02 -7.67 0.24 7.14 -27.37 -24.35 -15.53 
  4.68** 6.74** 1.67* 7.81** 5.49** 4.30** 2.54* 0.10 2.50* 12.00** 8.29** 2.65** 
n 1126 1126 1126 1712 1712 1712 1538 1538 1538 1639 1639 1639 
Partial R-squared 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.26 0.27 0.27 
Note: absolute values of t-stats are under the coefficients, with * signifying significance at the 10% level and ** at the 1% level. Results obtained via qreg in Stata 
